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INTRODUcTION
In recent years, the potential adverse impacts of transboundary
pollution have received heightened attention both domestically and
abroad.' International pollution may detrimentally affect outer space,
the atmosphere, the oceans, the weather, and possibly the climate,
freshwater bodies, groundwater aquifers, farmland, cultural heritage,
and life forms.2 Specific pollution threats- include acid deposition,
nuclear contamination, debris in outer space, stratospheric ozone
depletion, and toxic petroleum spills. The Chernobyl nuclear power
plant accident, on April 26, 1986, raised the world's consciousness
about the potentially devastating effects of transboundary nuclear pollution
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1. DANIEL BARSTOW MAGRAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLLUTION 4 (Daniel
Barstow Magraw ed., 1991).
2. l at 5.
3. See Philippe 3. Sands, The Environmen4 Community and International Law, 30 HARV.
INT'- L. 393,402 (1989) ("Chemobyl ... confirmed the danger this pollution poses to people,
to property, and to the environment ... [the accident] demonstrated that traditional
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Given this backdrop and the emerging interdependence of
nations, particularly within the European Economic Community, it is
not surprising that the United States, later joined by twenty-five other
countries, signed the "Convention on Environmental Impact Assess-
ment in a Transboundary Context" (hereinafter "the Convention") at
Espoo, Finland on February 25, 1991.' Among its provisions, the
Convention establishes legal procedures for bilateral and multilateral
protests against future sources of transboundary pollution.5  The
Convention also establishes a transboundary environmental impact
assessment process similar to the process implemented under the U.S.
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which is the first
national environmental impact assessment law passed by the U.S.
government.6 However, three years have passed since the United
States signed the Convention, and it still has not been formally
adopted.' Consequently, questions about its legal basis remain.
This Article examines issues relating to the implementation and
enforceability of the Convention in the United States and focuses on
the legal basis for the Convention. Specifically, this Article addresses
the issue of whether the Conventioh is a self-executing document,
legally undergirded by the President's inherent authority to bind the
federal government in foreign affairs;' or in the alternative, whether
NEPA, as extended by Executive Order 12,114 "Environmental
Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions,"9 serves as the underlying
legislative authority for the Convention. ° This Article argues that,
international law provides only a rudimentary structure for compensating for the damage to
persons and property that transboundary nuclear pollution causes, and that it provides neither
rights nor relief in respect of damage to the environment.").
4. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb 25,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter "Convention"]. As of June 11, 1991, the following states had
signed the Convention: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
5. Id.. art. 2-9, 30 LL.M. at 803-807.
6. Id. art. 4, 30 I.L.M. at 806. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1988)(requiring preparation of Environmental Impact Statement, public
notice, and recognition of worldwide implications).
7. The Convention enters into force after the .date of deposit of the sixteenth instrument
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Convention, supra note 4, art. 18, 30 I.L.M.
at 811.
8. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
9. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
10. Id.
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for the Convention to have a proper legal foundation, either NEPA
should be amended to apply extraterritorially, or the Convention
should undergo the normal treaty ratification process to firmly
establish it as "the law of the land."" To do anything less would
provide a tenuous legal basis for meeting and enforcing Convention
requirements.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the factual background of
the Convention as reported by persons who negotiated the Conven-
tion on behalf of the United States. Part I also examines substantive
portions of the Convention's twenty articles and seven appendices,
highlighting the obligations they impose. Part II explores implemen-
tation issues, particularly the proposal that the Convention be treated
as an Executive Agreement and the current debate over whether
NEPA, as extended by Executive Order 12,114, supports such an
agreement. The issue of NEPA's application extraterritorially is an
integral part of this discussion. This Article argues that there
currently exists no tenable legal basis for ratification of the Conven-
tion. Part III discusses the present status of the Convention, including
the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) draft guidelines
for implementation, and enforcement under international environmen-
tal law. This Article concludes by asserting that, for the Convention
to have a proper legal foundation, NEPA should be amended to
specifically apply extraterritorially or the Convention should go
through the normal treaty ratification process.
I. THE CONVENTION: AN OVERVIEW
The Convention, adopted by the Economic Commission for
Europe (ECE) on February 26,1991, is significant historically because
it is one of the first transboundary pollution agreements between
Eastern and Western European nations.'2  Commenting on the
11. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
12. Treaty Signed by Twenty-Six Nations Sets Way to Protest Cross-Border Pollution, 14
Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 99 (Feb. 27, 1991) [hereinafter Treaty Signed by Twenty-Six Nations].
However, this is disputed in Comment, Developments in the Law: International Environmental
Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1484,1558 n. 45 (1991), which asserts that the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10541, reprinted in 18 I.L.M.
1442 [hereinafter LRTAP] was the first such environmental agreement between Eastern
European and Western European nations. The LRTAP was concluded by 34 countries in
Europe and North America under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
and addresses transboundary air pollution. The LRTAP "establish[ed] notice and consultation
requirements for changes in the national policies of parties that might significantly affect levels
of transboundary air pollution." Id. at 1559.
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adoption of the Convention, ECE Executive Secretary Gerald
Hinteregger stated:
This is a major achievement in combating pollution and it will cause
significant changes in environmental legislation within many of the
signing nations ... Not only will it force all signing nations to
establish an environmental impact assessment procedure, but it will
allow governments and the public from other nations to participate
in that process from the start. 3
This section of the article briefly describes the adoption of the
Convention and provides a general overview of its requirements.
A. Background to the Convention
In 1978, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a
resolution directing the United States to work towards- a
transboundary convention; 4 the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) was viewed as the vehicle for accomplishing this
task. However, because of the difficulty obtaining consensus
among the diverse countries aligned with UNEP, the effort faltered
and the ECE became the proponent by adopting the Convention on
February 26, 1991.16 Previously the ECE had issued the European
Community Environmental Impact Assessment General Directive
(hereinafter "EIA Directive"), applicable to member states in the
European Economic Community.7 The EIA Directive is similar to
13. Treaty Signed by Twenty-Six Nations, supra note 12, at 99.
14. Treaty Signed by Twenty-Six Nations, supra note 12, at 99. Transboundary pollution
became a political concern in the United States as far back as 1941 with the Trail Smelter Case,
which was one of the first cases to document the harmful effects of air pollution migration. The
United States and Canada were parties to the case, which was heard by arbitrators who rendered
damage awards on April 16, 1938 and March 11, 1941. The case involved daniages caused to
Washington state by migrating fumes discharged from the Consolidated Mining and Smelting
Company in British Columbia. Canada had paid the United States $350,000 pursuant to findings
by the international Joint Commission. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 Rep. Int'l Arb.
Awards 1905, 1945-46 (1938). The Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal ordered Canada to pay an
indemnity of $78,000 plus interest for further environmental damage. It at 1940.
15. Interview with Anne Miller, Deputy Director, Office of Federal Activities, -U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 23,1994). Ms. Miller represented
the United States at several Convention negotiation sessions.
16. Idt
17. Council Directive No. 85/337, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40 [hereinafter "EIA Directive"]. A
similar agreement was recently signed by the three Belgian regions of Brussels, Flanders, and
Wallonia which provides for sharing of information and environmental impact assessments when
a project in one of the regions could have transboundary impact on another region. Three
Governments Agree to Share Data on Activities with Transboundary Impacts, 10 Int'l Envtl.
Rep. (BNA) 642 (July 27, 1994).
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NEPA and evidences the ECE's recognition that unconsidered growth
in a heavily populated region like Europe may produce significant
adverse transboundary impacts.'8
Because the Convention negotiators worked by consensus, the
task of honing the Convention was arduous and revealed the different
approaches of eastern and western hemisphere nations to environmen-
tal issues. For instance, many European states-wanted to clearly spell
out the terms of the Convention, describing the seventeen activities
that trigger Convention requirements, while other countries, such as
Canada and the United States, were more willing to have a broader
narrative description of these activities. 9 The negotiators considered
a broad range of provisions, including opening the Convention to non-
ECE members, such as Mexico, but could not reach agreement on
many of these issues. The final document generally represents hard-
won consensus.
20
B. Obligations Under the Convention
The Convention does not apply to existing transboundary
pollution sources, nor does it enable one nation to prevent another
from constructing a disputed project. It does, however, create an
affirmative obligation for signatory nations to prepare an environmen-
tal impact assessment (EIA) on proposed projects that may have
transboundary effects.2 The Convention requires the proponent of
a proposed action to provide the affected nation notice, comment, and
public participation.'
The Convention delineates the responsibilities of each party
planning an action with potential transboundary impacts. The main
requirements of the Convention are similar to those imposed by
18. Cf EIA Directive, supra note 17, pmbl. The European Community (now known as the
"European Union") directive has already been cited as authority, to intervene in some
noncomplying projects. The European Community Commission claimed the Italian government
failed to comply with the EIA directive in planning a new $4.4 billion, 37-mile highway which
would traverse the Appenine mountains. Highway Project Said To Comply with EC Assessment
Directive, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 200 (Apr. 8, 1992). The European Commission asked
Britain to suspend seven major construction projects, including a rail link to the new Channel
Tunnel, because the government allegedly failed to follow the EIA directive. Commission Says
Britain Ignored Environmental Rules on Seven Projects, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 566 (Oct.
23, 1991).
19. Interview with Anne Miller, supra note 15.
20. Interview with Anne Miller, supra note 15.
21. Convention, supra note 4, art. 2-11, 30 I.L.M. at 803-808.
22. Convention, supra note 4, art. 2-9, 30 I.L.M. at 803-807.
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NEPA. The primary responsibility of each party is to prevent,
reduce, or control significant adverse transboundary environmental
impacts from proposed activities.' Parties must establish an EIA
*procedure, similar to that imposed by NEPA, that affords public
notice and participation before a decision on the proposed action is
made.24
The signatories of the Convention announce in the Preamble
their awareness of the interrelationship between developmental
activities and their environmental consequences.' The parties to the
Convention affirm:
the need to give explicit consideration to environmental factors at
an early stage in the decision-making process by applying environ-
mental impact assessment, at all appropriate administrative levels,
as a necessary tool to improve the quality of information presented
to decision makers so that environmentally sound decisions can be
made paying careful attention to minimizing significant adverse
impact, particularly in a transboundary context.26
Under the Convention, the party initiating the proposed action,
called the "Party of origin," must provide information to "affected
Parties" and be available for consultation on the potential
transboundary impact of the proposed action.' Furthermore, the
party of origin must ensure that, in making its final decision on a
proposed action, it takes into account the outcome of the EIA,
including the -documents -and the comments received, as well as
concerns aired in consultations between the parties. 8 When provid-
ing the affected party its final decision, the party of origin must state
the reasons and considerations underlying its final decision29
, As with NEPA, the Convention does not require that the
proponent of the proposed action select the least environmentally
harmful alternative. However, the Convention does not preclude a
23. Convention, supra note 4, art. 7-11, 30 LL.M. at 807-808 (encouraging research
pfograms aimed at improving methods for assessing trarisboundary pollution impacts, for
achieving better understanding of cause-and-effect relationships and their role in integrated
environmental management, and for analyzing and monitoring efficient implementation of
decisions on proposed activities).
24. Convention, supra note 4, art. 4-5, 30 I.L.M. at 806.
25. Convention, supra note 4, pmbl., 30 LL.M. at 802.
26. Convention, supra note 4, pmbl., 30 I.L.M. at 802.
- 27. Convention, supra note 4, art. 3-5, 30 I.L.M. at 804-806 (providing for post-project
analysis which any party can request).
28. Convention, supra note 4, art. 6, 30 IL.M. at 806.
29. Convention, supra note 4, art. 6, 30 I.L.M. at 806.
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party from imposing more stringent requirements upon itsel, nor does
it abridge a party's right to enter new bilateral or multilateral
agreements in order to implement its Convention responsibilities."
Each party to the Convention has one vote.3' When a dispute
involving issues surrounding application of the Convention arises, it
is to be handled by negotiation, and parties may either elect to submit
their dispute to the International Court of Justice or request arbitra-
tion. If a party is dissatisfied with the Convention, the party may
voluntarily withdraw from the Convention any time after four years
from the date on which the party joined the Convention.
C. Applicability of the Convention
The Convention applies only to specific activities, enumerated in
Appendix I, that are likely to cause significant adverse transboundary
impact.3 For instance, activities such as the construction of
motorways, railway lines, airports with a basic runway length of at
least 2,100 meters, large diameter oil and gas pipelines, and hazardous
waste management facilities trigger the Convention's EIA require-
ment. 4 When it is questionable whether an activity requires an
EIA, the Convention establishes an analytic framework for making
such a determination. Various criteria are considered, such as the size
of the proposed activity, its location, and its potential effects on
humans or valued species.35
When parties are unable to agree on the Convention's applicabili-
ty to a proposed action or on the need for an EIA in a particular
case, the Convention sets up an "inquiry procedure." In this
procedure, the ECE Secretary selects an inquiry commission made up
of three experts. The commission may investigate the activity and, by
majority vote, render a decision on Convention applicability.36 The
Convention directs the inquiry commission to base its final opinion on
30. Convention, supra note 4, art. 8, 30 I.L.M. at 809.
31. Convention, supra note 4, art. 12, 30 I.L.M. at 809.
32. Convention, supra note 4, art. 15, 30 I.L.M. at 810 (providing that Party may declare
in writing in its acceptance or ratification document that it elects compulsory arbitration or
submission of its disputes to International Court of Justice).
33. Convention, supra note 4, app. 1, 30 I.L.M. at 812.
34. Convention, supra note 4, art. 2 & app. I, 30 I.L.M. at 802, 812-13.
35. These criteria are similar to those in the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
Guidelines implementing NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1994).
36. Convention, supra note 4, app. IV, 30 I.L.M. at 815-16.
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scientific principles 7 The parties must assist the inquiry commission
by providing facts, documents, and testimony 8 The commission is
given broad discretion and autonomy to make its own rules of
procedure and to take any "appropriate" measure to carry out its
function.39 Both the parties and the investigating commission are
charged with protecting the confidentiality of any information
received in confidence in the course of commission proceedings.4 °
Despite the Convention's well-articulated procedures for applying
requirements and resolving implementation disputes, questions about
applicability remain. There are three unresolved applicability issues
that are particularly troublesome to the United States:' First, it is
unclear whether the Convention applies to privately proposed or
conducted activities and, if so, to what extent it applies: Second, the
Convention does not specify whether it applies to U.S. military
activities. Finally, it is unknown whether the Convention exempts
sensitive national security information related to a proposed activity
from disclosure and, if so, what authority will determine if such
information is exempt.
II. LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONVENTION: AN EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENT, OR A SELF-RATIFYING TREATY BASED ON NEPA
AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114?
Possibly, the United States is postponing ratification of the
Convention because concerns about its legal basis persist. If the
Convention is executed as an Executive Agreement, the President's
authority to bind the United States in an agreement under the terms
of this Convention is disputable. Alternatively, if the Convention's
ratification is premised on NEPA, as expanded by Executive Order
12,114, the Convention's legal basis remains equally dubious. Because
NEPA applies to activities within the United States, it is unclear
whether the Convention would cover U.S. activities originating
abroad. The following discussion examines both alternatives and
illustrates why both are inadequate.
37. Convention, supra note 4, app. IV, 30 I.L.M. at 815-16.
38. Convention, supra note 4, app. IV, 30 I.L.M. at 815-16.
39. Convention, supra note 4, app. IV, 30 I.L.M. at 815-16.
40. Convention, supra note 4, app. IV, 30 I.L.M. at 815-16.
41. These issues may be clarified if the United States attaches reservations to its ratification
of the Convention.
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A. A Proposed Executive Agreement
The Convention has been proposed for execution as an Executive
Agreement rather than as a treaty. 2 Article II of the Constitution
endows the President with broad authority, stating that "[t]he
executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America."'  However, the scope and exact content of presidential
powers in foreign affairs is somewhat unspecific and has frequently
been debated.' One scholar noted that:
Without the consent of the Senate, the approval of Congress, or the.
support of a treaty, Presidents from Washington to Nixon have
made many thousands of agreements, of different degrees of
formality and importance, on matters running the gamut of
American foreign relations ... but the power to make them
remains vast, and its constitutional foundations and limits as
uncertain as ever.45
Executive Agreements concluded solely by the President have
been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.' For instance, in United
States v. Belmont, Justice Sutherland approved the executive's
authority to make an agreement incidental to officially recognizing the
Soviet Union, reasoning that "[G]overnmental power over external
affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national
government." '47 Similarly, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation, the Court characterized the power "to make such
international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitu-
tional sense as one of those powers which, though not expressly
affirmed by the Constitution, nevertheless exist as inherently
inseparable from the conception of nationality."'
Although there is some persuasive evidence that the President
has authority to execute binding Executive Agreements that may be
42. Interview with Anne Miller, supra note 15.
43. U.S. CONsT. art. II, §1, cl. 1.
44. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 44 (1972).
45. Id at 177. Another writer commenting on presidential authority over foreign affairs
has stated that "in foreign affairs [the Constitution] was often cryptic, ambiguous and
incomplete." Elliot L. Richardson Checks and Balances in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONsTrrUTION 25,27 n.9 (Louis HENKiN et al. eds., 1990) Michael J.
Glennon and William D. Rogers, eds. 1990) (quoting A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY 2 (1973)).
46. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
47. Id. at 330-31.
48. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
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construed as the law of the land, the limits of such Agreements have
not been extensively explored or defined, and unsettled questions
persist.49 For example, it is unclear whether, under international law,
the United States could ever claim it was not bound by an agreement
such as the Convention because it was made without the consent of
the Senate. 0 A similar unanswered question is whether a state can
lawfully be bound by Convention requirements if the executive was
acting ultra vires when he incurred the obligation on the state's behalf
and the Con-ention is not formally ratified as a treaty.5' Despite
these unsettled questions, it appears that the power of the President
to make Executive. Agreements in an international context is
generally accepted, despite occasional senatorial accusations that the
52President has usurped the treaty power.
B. The National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA, as expanded by Executive Order 12,114, may also be
viewed as the enabling, underlying legal authority for Convention
ratification. 3 NEPA and the Convention have similar requirements.
NEPA requires federal agencies proposing major federal actions to
assess the environmental impacts of those actions.' NEPA is
commonly viewed as a procedural rather than a substantive statute
because it does not mandate that the federal agency select the most
environmentally beneficial action. 5 Rather, NEPA merely directs
the federal government to examine the environmental impacts of a
proposed federal action 'and alternatives to the action.5 6 NEPA also
provides other agencies an opportunity to comment on the govern-
49. See Edmund S. Muskie, The Reins of Liberty - Congress, thp President, and American
Security, in FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONTIION 90,91-92 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert
A. Licht eds*, 1990).
50. HENKIN, supra note 44, at 427 n.21.
51. HENKiN, supra note 44, at 427 n.21. State compliance is not an immediate concern
because the Convention applies only to federal actions. However, states may be encouraged to
comply with the Convention if it is ratified. See Interview with Anne Miller, supra note 15.
52. HENKIN, supra note 44, at 420 n.1. According to Henkin, former Secretary of State
John FosterDulles estimated that about 10,000 informal Executive Agreements accompanied
the North Atlantic Treaty.
53. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1988).
54. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
55. NEPA requires the federal government to ensure that "environmental amenities and
values may be given appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic and
technical considerations." NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
56. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
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ment's proposal and analysis and makes those records public.5 7 CEQ
guidelines interpreting NEPA mandate a detailed, definitive assess-
ment process that includes public involvement and interagency
review."
NEPA may be enforced judicially, and prior litigation has assisted
in clarifying the statute's application within the United States.59
Unfortunately, litigation has not resolved questions about the extent,
if any, of NEPA's applicability abroad.' There is no clear statutory
or regulatory guidance as to whether NEPA and the EIS requirement
extend to federal actions involving overseas environmental impacts.
The statute squarely addresses extraterritorial application in only one
section, mandating that all agencies of the federal government shall:
[R]ecognize the worldwide and long range character of environmen-
tal problems and, where consistent with foreign policy of the
United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions
and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in
anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's
world environment.61
Although the NEPA assessment process has been used in negotiations
of international agreements, such as the New Panama Canal Trea-
ty,62 it does not appear that NEPA has ever been cited as the legal
basis for the United States' ratification of an international agreement.
This leaves unanswered the issue of whether the Convention implicitly
confers NEPA rights, such as judicial review, to other signatories
when NEPA is the underlying legal authority for Convention
ratification.
57. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
58. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1, 1500.2, 1506.6 (1994); see also Dinah Bear, "Nuts and Bolts of
Procedural Compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act," C993 ALI-ABA 1 (1994).
59. See, eg., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978);
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); NRDC v. Marsh, 568
F.Supp. 1387 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
60. Compare Public Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding there was
no "final agency action," therefore review of NEPA applicability was premature) and Public
Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.D.C. 1993) (same); with
Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990) (holding that executive agreement
between United States and West Germany overrode any extraterritorial applicability that NEPA
might have).
61. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(f) (1988).
62. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. IMPROVED
PROCEDURES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS OF U.S. ACTIONS ABROAD, Report to the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Toxic Substances, Research and Development, Committee on
Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, February 1994, at 3 (hereinafter GAO REPORT).
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C. Executive Order 12,114
Questions about NEPA's extraterritorial application are
necessarily complicated by President Carter's Executive Order 12,114,
which extends NEPA's application.' Executive Order 12,114
requires federal agencies taking major federal actions that have
significant effects on the environment outside the United States to
establish procedures, including NEPA analyses and documentation,
that will "facilitate environmental cooperation with foreign na-
tions."'  Compared with NEPA, the Executive Order's requirements
have been characterized as being more ambiguous and more limited
in both the range of activities covered and in the analysis and
participation required.' For example, the Order does not have any
implementing regulations, does not require evaluation of alternatives,
does not mandate public or interagency review, and confers no
standing for judicial review. However, unlike NEPA, Executive
Order 12,114 applies to federal actions that have a significant. effect
on any of the following: (1) a nation not participating with the
United States in the action, (2) a nation to which the United States
exports a product or a physical project that produces an emission or
effluent that is prohibited or strictly regulated in the United States'
because it poses a toxic or radioactive threat, (3) a designated natural
or ecological resource of global importance, or (4) the global com-
mons.
66
Actions in the global commons have recently sparked litigation
seeking to define the bounds of NEPA's applicability and to
determine whether the Executive Order provides a means for,
enforcing NEPA extraterritorially. In Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Massey, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
held that NEPA did not apply to actions of U.S. citizens overseas and
that the Executive Order did not provide, a private cause of action.67
However, on appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that there is no presumption against extraterritorial application of the
statute if the behavior occurs primarily in the United States or if the
63. Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 9, at 356-57.
64. Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 9, at 357.
65. GAO REPORT, supra note 62, at 2.
66. Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 9, at 357 (defining global commons to include the
oceans and Antarctica).
67. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991).
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extraterritorial effect of the statute will occur in Antarctica - a
continent with no sovereign and over which the United States has
some control.'
The Court of Appeals decision created a "headquarters theory,"
whereby decisions of the United States that direct projects outside the
United States become actions subject to NEPA. Under this analysis,
many activities of the Department of Defense as well as U.S.
multinational corporations operating with some federal involvement
could be subject to NEPA.69 The Court's broad analysis seemed to
ignore the well established Foley doctrine mandating that laws are
meant to apply domestically only, absent specific Congressional intent
to the contrary.7
0
In its decision not to appeal the case, the Department of Justice
chose to construe the holding narrowly and, uncharacteristically,
issued a statement explaining its decision:
[I]n declining to seek a rehearing in this case today, the Adminis-
tration has decided not to challenge the Court's precise holding -
namely, that the National Environmental Policy Act applies to the
National Science Foundation's activities in Antarctica described in
the opinion. However, the administration does not embrace
language in the opinion which may be interpreted to extend beyond
this holding.71
Shortly after the Massey decision, the District Court of the
District of Columbia held that NEPA did not require the Defense
Department to prepare environmental impact studies for U.S. military
installations in Japan because of the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of statutes. The Court emphasized that
doubts concerning extraterritorial application of statutes must be
68. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993):
69. See David Young, The Application of Environmental Impact Statements to United States
Participation in Multinational Development Projects, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 309 (1992).
70. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,285 (1942).
71. Press release, DOJ, March 15, 1993.
72. NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D. D.C. 1993). To support its
reliance on the presumption against extraterritorial application and restrictive interpretation of
questions involving the presumption, the Court cites two cases decided after Massey, which
clarify that choice of law considerations are not the only justification for the presumption. See
Smith v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 1183 (1993) (holding that presumption against
extraterritorial application of Federal Tort Claims Act prevents spouse of worker killed in
Antarctica from filing a wrongful death claim against the United States); Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549,2560 (1993) (holding that statutes prohibiting deportation of aliens
when their lives are threatened does not apply to Coast Guard interdiction of Haitian refugees
on the high seas).
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resolved restrictively and distinguished Massey because it involved the
unique status of Antarctica, which is not a foreign country but a
continent analogous to outer space.3
In conclusion, case law suggests that NEPA applies
extraterritorially only to actions involving the global commons, where
all nations -have a common nonproprietary interest. Questions remain
wfiether this would include actions such as U.S. military operations on
the high seas and U.S. space exploration ventures. Because case law
has circumscribed NEPA's application, it is doubtful that NEPA, as
written, offers a tenable basis for ratification of the Convention.
D. Legislative Proposals to Amend NEPA
More than one bill proposing to amend NEPA to apply
extraterritorially has floundered in committee. For example H.R.
1271, which authorized appropriations for the Office of Environmen-
tal Quality for fiscal years 1992 through 1996, contained a provision
that would ensure consideration of the impact of federal actions on
the global environment.74 Similarly, H.R. 1113 would have amended
NEPA by specifically adding the words "including extraterritorial
actions" to the first paragraph of section 102(2)(C) following the word
"actions."'75 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did
not support H.R. 1113 and an EPA representative testified that the
agency "is not convinced that applying NEPA, a domestic U.S.
statute, would' necessarily achieve the desired result overseas."'76
However, without such an amendment or formal ratification of the
Convention as a treaty, the Convention will not legally bind the
United States or its individual states.
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE CONVENTION IN THE U.S. AND
CANADA
In addition to the uncertain legal basis of the Convention, many
issues regarding implementation of the agreement remain. These
include the authority of the Council on Environmental Quality to
73. NEPA Coalition, 837 F. Supp. at 467.
74. H.R. 1271, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(c) (1991).
75. H.R. 1113, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(a)(1) (1989).
76. A Bill to Authorize Appropriations for the Office of Environmental Quality for Fiscal
Years 1989-1993 and Oversight of the National Environmental Policy Act: Hearings on H.R. 1113
Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1989). (statement of Jennifer I. Wilson, Assistant Administrator for External
Affairs, EPA).
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promulgate regulations, the legal status of provisions that extend
beyond NEPA, the scope of the Convention's provisions, and
mechanisms to enforce the agreement. This section reviews these
issues.
A. CEQ Guidelines
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was created -by
Title II of NEPA and, among other things, is chartered to:
[a]dvise and assist the President and the agencies in achieving
international cooperation for dealing with environmental problems,
under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State.77
CEQ is authorized to spend money in support of activities necessary
to implement international agreements. 8  However, CEQ's legisla-
tively-defined duties do not include implementing international agree-
ments.79 But, there, is a "catchall" phrase in NEPA that may be
interpreted to authorize CEQ to issue guidelines implementing
international agreements. This provision provides that all federal
agencies shall:
where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs
designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and
preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environ-
ment. o
Presumably as an extension of its NEPA authority, CEQ has
prepared draft guidelines for implementing the Convention in
consultation with the Department of State and the EPA."' The
proposed guidelines state that the Convention is not intended to alter
an agency's substantive implementation of NEPA or Executive Order
12,114, but rather is intended to provide a procedure for including
public members and other countries' agencies in the current U.S.
practice.' The EPA anticipates that, once the Convention is
ratified, the transboundary impact analysis prescribed by the
Convention will mirror the NEPA process."
77. Exec. Order No. 11,514,3 C.F.R. 904-(1966-1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
78. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4346(b) (1988).,
79. See NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1988).
80. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(f) (1988).
81. Interview with Joe Montgomery, Office of Federal Activities, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 6, 1994).
82. Id.
83. Id."
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Although CEQ was created by NEPA, it derives its authority to
issue implementing guidelines on Environmental Impact Statement
preparation not from NEPA, but from Executive Order 11,514, which
President Nixon issued "in furtherance of the purpose and policy of"
NEPA.' 4 Supplementing this, President Carter issued Executive
Order 11,991, with the intent of creating a single set of uniform,
mandatory CEQ regulations binding upon federal agency heads.'
The mandatory character of CEQ's regulations has been judicially
upheld.86
Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether CEQ's guidelines imple-
menting the Convention will bind federal agencies once they .are
finalized. Arguably, these guidelines are binding because they derive
from the CEQ's authority to implement NEPA. However, this
argument is premised upon NEPA being the legal basis for Conven-
tion ratification, which is an unsettled question.
B. Further Unsettled Issues and Questions
In addition, many questions remain as to the nature of the
Convention's mandates. The following discussion illustrates several
of these issues.
Certain provisions of the Convention appear to go beyond
NEPA's requirements. For instance, the Convention requires a
"Party of origin" to initiate consultation whenever there is a finding
of potential significant adverse environmental impactY In contradis-
tinction to NEPA, the Convention does not provide for "Findings of
No Significant Impact" or provide for "Categorical Exclusions." It is
unclear how activities meeting these NEPA descriptions will be
handled under the Convention.
In addition, the Convention does not address requirements of
other statutes that are relevant to the NEPA analysis process. For
example, it is uncertain whether the substantive and procedural
requirements of the Endangered Species Act' apply if a proposed
action threatens a protected species or habitat. Resources .such as
endangered species or buildings with historical significance might be
84. Exec. Order No. 11,514, supra note 77, at 904.
85. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123-24 (1977).
86, See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979).
87. Convention, supra note 4, art. 5, 30 I.L.M. at 806.
88. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (West Supp. 1992).
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addressed under the Convention as part of an EIA, but no affirmative
duty to consider such impacts exists.
Significant questions remain as to the applicability of 'the
Convention, including its geographical scope, the types of activities
covered, and the threshold of activity triggering the Convention's
requirements. For example, it is unclear whether Convention
obligations attach to the activity of a vessel or an aircraft since it is
unclear whether either of these, constitute an "area" within the
meaning of "transboundary impact" as defined in Article I. Further,
it remains to be seen whether the Convention affects the navigational
freedoms shared by Department of Defense vessels and aircraft.
Many of these vessels and aircraft have nuclear components, including
nuclear-powered generators, potentially making them subject to
Convention requirements since the Convention specifically covers
nuclear power stations and nuclear reactors.89
Some of these questions and issues might be resolved if the
United States appends reservations to its acceptance document. If
and when the United States deposits its instrument of approval on the
Convention, it may include three provisos: (1) that the Convention
does not bind the individual states, (2) that the Convention does not
create a cause of action against the Federal Government, and (3) that
the United States does not accept compulsory arbitration of disputes
(because this may be considered a compromise of national sovereign-
ty).
C. Enforcement of the Convention Under International
Environmental Law
The Convention, similar to Executive Order 12,114, does not by
its terms create a legal cause of action. Therefore, since the Conven-
tion has no real "teeth," it is questionable whether its requirements
will be enforced. Apparently, moral suasion and the integrity of
signatories are the only insurance for compliance. Instead of
sanctions, the Convention relies on the voluntary cooperation and
adherence of the signatories. This alliance among signatories forms
the basis for a novel kind of international environmental impact
assessment procedure.'
89. Convention, supra note 4, app. I, 1 2-3, 30 I.L.M. at 812-13.
90. Treaty Signed by Twenty-Six Nations, supra note 12, at 99.
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The Transnational School of International Law teaches that
coercive sanctions are not necessary to form international legal order.
Rather, the Transnational School proposes 'that:
law can be viewed as deriving its binding force, not from the
'power' of its source and the threat of punishment, but from the
'acceptance of a norm as binding.'91
The Transnational School recognizes and encourages cooperative
efforts such as the EIA Directive and the Convention as necessary for
"the global good." Arguably, since the Convention is the product of
transnational will, sanctions and standing to sue are not necessary for
compliance. Instead, parties have a mechanism for dispute resolution
and a provision for a hearing before the Ifiternational Court of
Justice.' The provision for an inquiry commission under the
Convention is another neutral mechanism for resolving disputes. 3
The Transnational School view of international environmental
law envisions agreements like the Convention, which transcend
national boundaries in order to address problems such as
transboundary pollution.94  Indeed, transnational law embraces all
law that regulates actions or events that extend beyond national
frontiers, and it includes both public and private international law as
well as other rules that do not completely fit into such standard'
categories. 5 Theories of transnational law, as compared to other
schools, supply a larger storehouse of rules on which to draw, because
the transnational view is not founded on the concept of the nation-
state as the supreme basis for law. Instead, the transnational view
oversteps provincial notions of territoriality and embraces norms,
customs, and conventions that are not bound by sovereignty. 6
.91. ALLEN SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 39 (1993) (quoting
WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUcTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1964)).
92. Convention, supra note 4, art. 15, 30 I.L.M. at 810.
93. Convention, supra note 4, art. 3 & app. IV, 30 I.L.M. at 804, 815.
94. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUcTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37
(1964).
95. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
96. Id Jessup states that the territorial emphasis in English common law can be traced to
the insular position of England, having no international land boundaries and knowing only the
boundaries-between counties. He posits that this common law concept of territoriality was
subsumed by U.S. law. Id. at 43-44.
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CONCLUSION
Because our society is becoming increasingly transnational, there
is growth in the volume and scope of international agreements such
as the Convention. The principal agents of these transnational
agreements are the nation-states, using instruments of multilateral or
bilateral international conventions.
"The acceptance of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and other
international conventions.., as sources of modern international law
is therefore no longer a matter of .doubt."'  However, without
proper legal foundation, the reason for enforcing these conventions
is often merely moral suasion. Thus, to ensure that the Convention
is legally binding on the United States, a more tenable basis than the
uncertain power of the Executive to make agreements is needed.
Instead, the. Convention either should be formally ratified as a treaty
or should rely on NEPA as enabling legislation for ratification, which
would require amendment of NEPA to apply extraterritorially. If
either of these options were accomplished, the Convention's require-
ments would be unquestionably binding and consistent with U.S. law.
The Convention is an example of a revealing trend. "The
changing structure of international law is a direct response to the
social transformation taking place in international society.,9 8 As
described by one writer:
While the national state continues to be the overwhelmingly
important form of political organization in international society, and
the principal repository of legal power, the national state, and its
symbol, national sovereignty, is becoming increasingly inadequate
to meet the needs of our time.9
Were it not for the unified effort of the ECE, the Convention
might not exist today. The kind of cooperative effort that produced
the Convention is recognized by the Transnational School as essential
in today's world of increasing interdependence. It is a significant
move towards global awareness of environmental impacts and
environmental accountability. Most importantly, the Convention
represents the growing universalization of an environmental ethic that
recognizes our mutual dependency.
97. FRIEDMANN, supra note 94, at 69.
98. SPRINGER, supra note 91, at 39-40 (quoting FRIEDMANN, supra note 94, at 365-66).
99. FRIEDMANN, supra note 94, at 365-66.
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